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Abstract 
This paper employs a new database of 212 Chinese listed companies from 
Hushen 300 index during the period of 2007-2011. The study finds that 
leverage of Chinese listed firms increases with fixed asset and proportion of 
non-tradable shares, and decreases with profitability and growth opportunities. 
It does not find significant effect of capital structure by firm size, non-debt tax 
shields and tax rate. Volatility of earnings is significantly negatively related with 
long-term leverage. Environment dynamism and leverage have significantly 
negative impact on firms¶ performance while size is positively rated with firms¶ 
performance. Evidence shows no significant relation between firms ¶ 
performance and the interaction of dynamism and capital structure. 
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Chapter1. Introduction 
The decision of corporate capital structure which reflects the proportionate 
relationship between debt and equity is of much importance. It determines 
firmV¶ capacity to repay debt and refinance and future profitability. The option 
capital structure is maximizing the wealth of shareholder and share price and 
minimizing the cost of capital. The choice of capital structure is a well-studied 
topic in developed countries since these researches provide theoretical 
models to explain the pattern of capital structure and find empirical evidence 
considering theoretical models have explanatory power when running these 
models in real business world. But it is still difficult to decide the optimal capital 
structure due to conflicting research result in the empirical literature (Myers, 
1984). Researchers try to solve capital structure problems from different 
aspects, such as tax-bankruptcy trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Modigliani and Miller, 1963), informational asymmetry perspective (Myers, 
1984; Myers and Mailuf, 1984), agency problem theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986), and market-timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Many empirical studies do provide support to those existing theories of the 
choice of capital structure, but a lot more do not show completely consistent 
evidence. Furthermore, raising debt for capital helps firm to create value with 
extreme agency problems by decreasing overinvestment (Harvey et al., 2004), 
while krygman (1999) stated that debt capital pushed firms forward to take 
more risk and lead emerging market to instability.  
 
1.1 Incentive and purpose 
Even though the majority of capital structure studies has concentrated on 
understanding of the determinates which influence the financial behavior of 
developed countries, there are increasing researches of capital structure in 
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emerging market that give opportunities to researchers to make time series 
and cross-sectional comparisons between different countries around the world. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that the variables correlated with the 
leverage ratio of the U.S. firms were also correlated to firms in G-7 countries 
by using the models of capital structure derived from the set of U.S. firms. 
However, according to Wald¶s (1999) study, due to institutional differences and 
agency and monitoring problems, capital structure decision of firms across 
countries may vary, though the results of capital structure studies (Hodder and 
Senbet, 1990; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Chui et al., 2002) from developed 
countries have many institutional similarities. It is interesting and important to 
see whether the factors found in developing countries affect capital structure 
choice are consistent with those determinants in developed countries. 
 
Since China implemented its economic reforms for transiting centrally-planned 
economy to market economy in the late 1970s, its average GDP has increased 
by 10.7% from 2003 to 20111 and has been the largest exporting country in 
year 20102. China has already become the second largest economy behind 
the U.S. and the importance of China¶s economy will continue to grow in the 
next decade. With the rapid growth in economy and its economic impact, 
Chinese market is of particular interest to study. There are a large number of 
studies of capital structure in developed countries, but little is known about 
China¶s firms¶. In the past time before 1970s, China¶s government 
implemented centrally-planned economy policy under which the majority of 
large corporations were state owned enterprises. A lot of findings provide 
evidence that firms with political connections can take advantages of 
regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), easily generate capital by 
accessing to equity market (Francis et al., 2009) and bank loans (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005 and Fraser et al, 2006). Dong et al (2010) study the relationship 
                                                          
1
 Data from: http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/08-15/4109921.shtml, accessing date: 2012/08/27. 
2
 Data from: http://money.163.com/10/0108/14/5SGVO50O00252UPR.html, accessing date: 2012/07/30. 
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between political patronage and capital structure of non-listed Chinese firms. 
They found long-term debt ratio is positively correlated with legal person 
institutional ownership and state ownership which suggests firms with political 
patronage tend to raise more long-term debt. It forces us to study the effect of 
ownership structure on capital structure LQ&KLQD¶s listed companies.  
 
In this paper, listed companies from China¶s Hushen300 index have been 
chosen to construct regression models to test whether the determinants of 
capital structure of China¶s firms are consistent with findings in developed 
countries. Brandt and Li (2003), and Cull et al. (2009)¶ s study suggests that 
private and small firms in China face more difficulties to take loans from banks 
which are state owned as well and have to use more expensive financing 
resources. Furthermore, firms which have state ownership find easier to take 
bank loans than private firms, especially large firms. The state ownership, legal 
person (LP) ownership and senior managers¶ ownership of equity are all 
non-tradable in Chinese market. Thus, the consideration of ownership of 
non-tradable shares which reflects the ownership concentration level has been 
added in the regression models.  
 
Hart (1995) mentioned that the most important thing for corporate 
management is not to give managers control power or merit pay, but to design 
an optimal capital structure in order to prevent managers sacrifice investors 
interest for personal goals. For the importance of capital structure decision, 
models also are constructed to see the impact of capital structure on firms¶ 
performance. Simerly and Li (2000) has studied the relationship of 
environmental dynamism, capital structure and performance of listed 
companies. They found that firms tend to perform well with more debt 
financing under a stable corporate environment while firms¶ performance takes 
disadvantages of high leverage for a strong dynamic environment. But their 
studies mainly focus on market of the U.S.. Being compared to the mature 
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developed market, China¶s market has a significant feature of environmental 
dynamism as an economic transition country. For a further study of capital 
structure, this paper is going to test the relationship between capital structure 
and firms¶ performance. 
 
Thus, this paper is going to try to answer three questions: (1)do the 
determinants found in Chinese listed companies consist with those in western 
countries; (2)does the ownership of non-tradable shares affect Chinese listed 
companies¶ capital structure; (3)how do capital structure influence companies¶ 
performance of Chinese listed firms 
 
1.2 Structure of this paper 
The remainder of this paper is consisted of 5 parts. In part 2, some background 
of China¶s market and basis theories of capital structure are discussed. Part 3 
gather some literature review of capital structure and its impact on 
performance. Part 4 is going to present the data collection and methodology of 
this research. The regression results and analysis of findings are showed in 
part 5, and finally part 6 generates conclusion of this study and gives 
suggestions for future study.   
 
 
Chapter2. Background, theories and 
hypothesis 
This chapter focuses on some backgrounds information of the market where 
target listed companies operate. Part 1 talk about some institutional 
11 
 
background of Chinese market and part 3 provide some empirical findings of 
recent situation of capital structure in Chinese listed firms. 
 
2.1 Institutional background 
2.1.1 Features of Chinese market 
Following the reform and open up policy, lots of large and medium-sized state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in China become corporatized. Nowadays, the 
state still holds some proportion of shares in the corporatized SOEs by direct 
or indirect shareholding. The indirect holding power has been achieved 
through variety of state owned institutions, such as state holding companies, 
state asset management agencies and state investment companies. Since the 
independent non-state institutional investors are very little, much of the 
non-state ownership is individual shareholders. In year 2010, China¶s stock 
market welcomed its 20th anniversary at which there are 2441 3  listed 
companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 42% of those companies, 1024 entities, are controlled by 
shareholders related to state background, including SOEs, central 
state-owned institutions, local government, local SOEs and universities etc. 
There are two obvious features of the institutional environment for Chinese 
listed companies. First of all, the majority of Chinese listed firms were stated 
owned in past years and a large portion of these firms are still under the control 
rights by the state after going public. The ³big four´ banks are also state owned 
though these banks claim their transition of corporatization. They give those 
SEOs disproportionately large rights of credit extend (Gordon and Li, 2003; 
Brandt and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). Secondly, China is still on its long way 
to transfer centrally-planned economy to a market economy. Incentive 
                                                          
3
 Data from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/observation/2010-12/01/c_12834822_3.htm, accessing date: 
2012/0728. 
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mechanism for producers and consumers depends on both market and 
political ways to push the economy forward. There is no explicit boundary of 
function among government, state owned enterprises and private sector. It still 
needs time for China to solve these problems. The future economy developing 
of China will rely more and more on market and private sector.  
 
Institutional structures in China not only differ from developed countries, but 
also many developing countries. For instance, according to Modigliani and 
Miller¶s (1963) study, under the condition of a command economy, tax has no 
impact on the decision of capital structure. This is due to the state or 
government is the owner of companies and banks, as well as the beneficiary of 
tax. Firms do not need to raise more debt to pay interest to take tax shields.    
 
2.1.2 Bankruptcy Laws in China 
In 1988, it was the first time that the PHRSOH¶s Republic of China implemented 
law of enterprise bankruptcy (called the Bankruptcy Law henceforth), which 
was initially promulgated to deal with bankruptcy of state owned enterprises. 
The emendatory 19th chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure ± Debt 
Repayment Order in Legal Entity Bankruptcy, was issued by the National 
People¶s Congress in 1991. Since then, the Bankruptcy Law has provided a 
direct basis for dealing with the bankruptcy of non-state owned enterprises and 
taken account of the bankruptcy of all companies in China into the legal 
system.  
 
There were many problems related to the implementing the Bankruptcy Law 
(Wu and Liu, 2008; Fan et al., 2009). Firstly, firms involved in bankruptcy need 
to pay their employees¶ claim and creditors had to wait after that, no matter 
these creditors possess secured claims or not.  
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Secondly, the real debtors of bankruptcy entity were difficult to identify since 
state owned enterprises has no clear ownership structure. Therefore, it was 
usually hard for creditors to get debt back. Even if for the major creditors of 
SOEs, state owned banks, it was difficult to claim repayment of debt. Thus the 
banks were one of the voices to against the bankruptcy filings. 
 
Thirdly, SOEs could get more financial supports from government than 
non-state owned enterprises. For example, bankruptcy SEO was given prior 
support like bad debt write-offs, which was denied to given to private firms. 
According to Fan et al.¶s (2009) research, firms with large state ownership face 
less bankruptcy cost than other ownership as those firms expect the state will 
secure them out of financial distress.  
 
Finally, enterprises with foreign ownership were not clearly stated in both the 
Bankruptcy Law and the emendatory code. It did not give much guidance 
about the rights of foreign owners and debt holders. In 2007, a completely new 
Bankruptcy Law was implemented in China. The new Bankruptcy Law allowed 
not only state owned enterprises and private enterprises, but also financial 
institutions, to go bankruptcy. It also removed some obstacle to liquidation of 
SOEs. However, the bankruptcy of partnership business, sole proprietorship 
firm and natural person were not included in the new law. Thus, debt financing 
is a barrier of firms¶ performance due to lack of protection to debt holders in 
China. 
 
2.1.3 Corporate tax 
Interests paid for debt are tax deductible expenses in P&L account in 
developed countries as well as China. In China¶s 1994 tax reform, two different 
firm tax regimes had been introduced for domestic companies and those with 
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foreign ownership. Domestic firms undertake corporate income tax rate of 33% 
while 15-24% for foreign ownership firms. Gordon and Li (2003) conclude that 
corporate income tax rate in China are widely consistent with the findings in 
other emerging market. But the tax burden for domestic firms is too heavy due 
to the dual-track tax regimes. A new Corporate Income Tax Law was enacted 
by the National People¶s Congress in 2007 that both domestic and foreign 
firms use a single income tax rate of 25%. However, tax law in different 
provinces in China varies. This may lead to different effects on capital structure 
decision across regions. 
 
2.2 Current Capital Structure of Chinese Listed firms  
There are a lot of researches imply that Chinese listed firms have salient 
features of preferring: external financing than internal resources; equity 
financing to raising debt; current liabilities to long-term debt (Chen and Rao, 
2003; Liu and Zhang, 2008; Feng, 2008; Wu 2008; and Zhang, 2009). With the 
development of macro-economy and firm itself, listed firms continue to 
optimize their capital structure, especially under the pressure from financial 
crisis. Table 1 shows data about recent situation and problems of Chinese 
listed companies¶ capital structure. 
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Table 1 Capital structure analysis of listed firms in various industries 20084 
 
sector 
internal financing external financing (bm᪳) 
debt-to-asset 
ratio 
amount 
proportion 
liability 
equity 
(bm᪳) Current long-term 
Finance and Insurance 18.087 0.99% 1686.817 0.765 112.256 92.83% 
Real Estate 0.293 5.90% 1.825 0.77 2.06 52.52% 
Social Service 0.419 11.05% 0.953 0.473 1.947 37.61% 
Transportation and Logistic 0.826 5.62% 3.979 3.213 6.675 48.95% 
communication and culture 0.218 10.92% 0.361 0.17 1.252 26.55% 
Utilities and Energy 0.934 8.50% 2.864 2.719 4.461 50.86% 
Wholesale and Retail 0.214 8.42% 1.155 0.095 1.081 49.10% 
Mining 20.581 21.98% 23.843 9.851 39.347 35.98% 
Construction 0.215 1.69% 4.579 0.807 7.114 42.36% 
Manufature 0.592 9.69% 2.17 0.904 2.443 50.32% 
Information Technology 0.07 2.72% 0.641 0.033 1.82 26.29% 
Agriculture,Fishing, 
Forestry and animal 
husbandry 
0.095 4.71% 0.815 0.123 0.988 46.40% 
mean 2.223 0.0829 3.926 1.742 6.2898 42.45% 
Mean in last row in the table is the average value of every column excluding Finance and 
Insurance industry because firms in this industry have significant high debt as an outlier.  
 
Low proportion of internal financing 
According to pecking order theory, firms make decision for raising capital 
follow preference: internal resources, then debt finances and finally equity 
financing. However, figures in table 1 show that although capital structure in 
different industries may vary, the highest proportion of internal financing of total 
                                                          
4
 Data in table 1 is from two Chinese databases: Resset and DB 
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capital in Chinese listed companies just achieve 21.98% while the lowest is 
0.99% in 2008. We can probably infer that Chinese listed companies mainly 
depend on outside capital resources rather than its own accumulative funds for 
expanding production and operation scale. With more external funds, capital 
costs and financing risk for firm increases.   
 
More equity than debt financing 
An obvious feature of capital structure in Chinese listed companies showed in 
table 1 is that firms tend to issue large numbers of shares to raising funds 
rather than borrowing. At the end of year 2007 in the U.S., bond market had 
taken a proportion of 13% to 14% of total securities market value while stock 
market took a little bit lower proportion by 12% to 13%. The balance of bond is 
over 150% of total GDP in the U.S., Japan and the U.K., while only 53% in 
China. The most of the 53% bonds are government debts, whereas only 3% is 
corporate bonds5. The data in table also shows low debt to total asset ratio of 
average of 42.5% of Chinese listed companies due to high proportion of equity 
financing which lead to high costs of capital and obstacle of maximizing firm 
value.   
 
Much current debt in external financing 
From table, we can see that Chinese listed companies have comparatively 
passive attitudes of long-term debt to current debt. The proportion of average 
current debt to total debt reaches 78%. Excluding finance and insurance 
industry of over 99% current debt to total debt, information technology industry, 
agriculture, fishing, forestry and animal husbandry industry, and construction 
industry¶s ratios are 95%, 87% and 85% respectively6. Although debt financing 
reduces costs of capital in some extent, but firms using heavy current debt to 
maintain operation increases pressure for pay off in short time in the result 
                                                          
5
http://finance.hsw.cn/gb/finance/2008-03/05/content_6845101.htm  
6
 95%=0.641/(0.641+0.033), 87%=0.815/(0.815+0.123), 85%=(4.579+0.807), figures from table 1. 
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augmenting financial risk and operating risk and negatively affect long-term 
stable development.   
 
 
Chapter3. Literature review 
This chapter is composed of 3 sections. Section 1 discusses several basic 
theories on capital structure. With generating understanding basis of financing 
decision, section 2 lists some empirical studies about the determinants of 
capital structure. Section 3 focuses on the literature of the relationship among 
environmental dynamism, capital structure and firm¶s performance. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Basis 
This part concentrates on five popular theories of capital structure. Several 
different concepts of capital structure are explained because those theories 
are the foundation to do further research in this study field.  
 
(1)Modigliani and Miller Proposition 
The increasing interest to study capital structure started from Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) publishing their debate of capital structure. Their primary theory 
was established by the following preconditions: (1) no transaction for investors; 
(2) borrowing and lending at the same rate for investors; (3) same operating 
risk for firms with similar operating condition; (4) all the cash flows are 
perpetuity; (5) expectation of the firms¶ future average operating income is the 
same for every investors; (6) firms¶ EBIT keeping stable and all the retained 
earnings distributed to shareholders; (7) no corporate and individual income 
tax.  
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Under the above perfect market, two propositions had been proved by 
mathematical and logical inference. One was that firm¶s value was 
independent of debt ratio and capital structure was irrelevant to its value. 
Firm¶s weighted average capital cost (WACC) was independent on debt as well. 
The other one was that the cost of equity goes up with the increasing of debt 
because shareholders required risk premium for firms raising more debt. Thus, 
in a perfect market, firm¶s value and share price were not influenced by debt 
ratio.  
 
Of course, this kind of perfect market does not exist in reality. In order to make 
the theory practicable as a guidance of capital structure for firms, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) adjusted their theorem. The revised theory took the impact of 
income tax into account and the point of view that there was no optimal capital 
structure was overthrown. They regarded the income tax as an indirect subsidy 
by government to firms while the interest of debt was expenses before tax, so 
that the rising up of debt ratio would lead to WACC decreasing and the value of 
firm increased.  
 
There are two points of the new proposition: (1) when corporate income tax 
exists, firms can employ financial leverage to reduce the real cost of capital 
and augment firms¶ value due to interest expenses are tax deductible. In this 
condition, generally regard that firms¶ value reaches its maximization when 
firms¶ capital consists of 100% debt; (2) cost of equity of levered firm equals to: 
the cost of equity of unlevered firm with same risk, plus the difference of cost of 
the equity and debt plus, risk premium. This risk premium depends on both 
debt ratio and income tax rate. Thus, higher leverage level, higher cost of 
equity due to more risk for shareholders. Although the adjusted MM theory 
considered conditions of imperfect market, it mainly focused on the tax effect 
and the relationship between the cost of debt and equity, while did not put 
much attention on the factors leading to high capital cost such as financial 
19 
 
distress. 
 
(2) The Trade-off Theory 
MM theorem considered impact of tax shields but ignore the threats by 
financial distress which may be possible leading firm to bankruptcy. As long as 
firm involved in financial distress, there will be a series of extra expenses. The 
trade-off theory, which focuses on the benefits and costs of issuing debt, has 
prediction that an optimal target financial debt ratio exists which maximizes the 
value of the firm (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Myers, 1984).  
 
Myers (2001) suggested that the optimal point can be attained when the 
marginal value of the benefits associated with debt issues exactly offsets the 
increase in the present value of the costs associated with issuing more debt. 
According to the impact of tax shields, value of firm can increase by raising 
more debt, at the meanwhile, the possibility of financial distress for firm goes 
up, even suffering bankruptcy. No matter firm will go bankruptcy or not, there 
will be extra cost for the appearance of financial distress which lead to 
decrease firm¶s value.  
 
The possibility of financial distress brings 2 costs: (1) if firm were going to 
bankruptcy, there will be direct and indirect bankruptcy costs; (2) With growing 
possibility of financial distress, managers who also own shares of firms 
representing shareholders¶ interest will tend to choose suboptimal or 
non-optimal projects to maximize their own benefits and sacrifice debt holders¶ 
interest. This conflict is known as agency problems. Due to the threats of 
bankruptcy, managers are forced by senior debt to give up profitable 
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
point out that an optimal capital structure requires a trade-off between the 
benefit of tax shield and the costs of financial distress brought by borrowing too 
much. 
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Various imperfections of market are in the consideration of trade-off theory, 
include income taxes, costs of financial distress and agency problems, but 
exclude the assumption of efficient market and symmetric information. The 
trade-off theory do not account for the relationship between low leverage level 
and high profitability. This theory rationalizes stable leverage level, which is 
coincidence with the fact that firms with comparatively secured, tangible assets 
tend to raise more debt than firms with risky, intangible assets. Possibility of 
financial distress increases when business risk is high and intangible assets 
are more likely to maintain damages when firms involve in financial distress 
(Myers, 2001)  
 
(3) Pecking order theory 
Pecking order theory of capital structure can trace back to 1960s when 
Donaldson (1961) pointed that companies prefer to generate capital from 
retained profits, then from raising debt and finally from issuing new shares. 
Myers (1984) introduced information asymmetry to theory of capital structure 
and clearly articulated the pecking order of generating capital in 1984. It is an 
alternative to the traditional target capital structure theory. Myer ¶s view was 
strongly supported by Taggart (1986) that pecking order theory has stronger 
explanatory power than target capital structure hypothesis. The pecking order 
theory suggested that firm prefer using internal financing resources to external 
fund, if it has to obtain external resource, prefer debt to equity. Myers (2001) 
summarized the pecking order theory more accurately. But pecking order 
theory suggests that optimal capital structure does not exist and firms rank 
criteria to satisfy their own financing requirements.    
 
The pecking order theory considers that the existence of information 
asymmetries is certain due to separation of right of ownership and right of 
management. Usually, the internal corporate managers know much more 
about the situation of operating, investment and profitability of firms than the 
21 
 
outside investors. These outside investors make their investment decision 
according to judging the signals from internal managers. The capital structure 
of a firm is one of the ways for internal managers to transmit corporate 
information to outside investors. Myers and Majluf ¶s (1984) research shows 
that equity financing is a negative signal of firm¶s operation. When managers 
are looking for funds for new investment, they will use internal information to 
issue new equity if share price of the firm is overpriced. However, investors are 
rational and understand information asymmetries, they will underestimate both 
existing and new share¶s price when new shares are issued. Finally, the share 
price goes down and firm¶s market value decrease as well. To the side of debt 
financing, when firms generate profit from investment project, shareholders 
received more benefit than debt holders who only receive fixed interest 
payment. And secured asset are as pledge, thus the value of a firm is not 
significantly influenced. For internal financing, it is mainly from the retained 
earnings of firm¶s operating activities. Using these funds to reinvest, firms do 
not need to have contracts with investors, do not pay for this part of capital cost 
and have fewer restrictions. As a result, firms prefer using internal financing to 
debt financing, if have to use outside resource, prefer debt to equity, especially 
lower risky and safer bond. 
 
Furthermore, based on pecking order theory of choosing capital structure, an 
alternative time-series hypothesis was proposed (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999). The results of their findings provide more suggestion to the pecking 
order theory more accurate than target capital structure model. They also 
conclude there is a positive relationship between the cost of capital and debt 
under the pecking order theory. 
 
(4) Agency Cost Theory 
One of the implications of market imperfection of corporate financial policies is 
agency problems coming from the ownership structure of the company. 
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Barnea et al. (1981) stated that agency problems can be caused between the 
principal and the agent, or can happen among principals themselves.  
 
Agent relationship is that the principal give agent some decision rights to the 
agent and require benefits as feedback (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agent 
cost theory assumes that both agent and principal look for utility maximization 
in result, agent will not always take decision only for principal¶s interest. To 
solve this problem, principals can give economic encourages and supervision 
to agent or require agent provide part of asset as pledge. But the agent real 
action still differs from the action which maximizes principal¶s utility. This part of 
loss of principle is called residual loss. Thus, the agency costs are consisted 
with supervision cost of principal, guarantee cost of agent, and residual loss 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Debt financing can restrict manager ¶s activity 
somehow, but it leads to another agency cost that managers may take up high 
risky project to look for residual profit (Hunsaker, 1999; Garvey and Hanka, 
1999). 
 
The conflict between shareholders and debt holders is due to debt covenant 
which encourages shareholders to take suboptimal investment choice. Debt 
covenant enable shareholders prefer high risk project because under this 
contract shareholders can generate large profits if project successes while 
debt holders undertake a large proportion of obligation because of limited 
liability of shareholders if project fails. Of course, if the debt holders can predict 
the firm¶s future investment properly, they will require higher rate of return so 
that shareholders faces higher cost of debt. Smith and Warner (1979) classify 
four sources of the conflict: claim dilution, asset substitution, dividend 
payments, and under-investment and mis-investment.  
Thus, there is a trade-off between the agency cost of equity and the agency 
cost of debt. The optimal capital structure is reached when the equity financing 
and debt financing¶s marginal agency costs equal which means the total 
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agency costs is minimized.  
 
(5) Signaling Effect Theory 
In 1970s, Ross (1977) constructed signaling model for expectation of 
operating performance. It was the first time to point out firms can use 
appropriate capital structure to reflect real financial situation. The model of 
signaling effect theory of capital structure was established on the basis of 
information asymmetry to internal stuff and external investors about firm ¶s true 
value and investment opportunities. Information asymmetries of firm¶s internal 
stuff result in distorted market value of firm¶s real value and inefficient 
investment for external investors. Based on information asymmetries, different 
capital structure of firm conveys its different real market value to the market, 
therefore, firm¶s internal stuff will choose a proper capital structure to provide a 
beneficial positive signal to outside and avoid negative signal.   
 
There are a large numbers of empirical studies on signaling theory (Ross, 
1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; John, 1987; Hunsaker, 
1999). Investors usually regard that higher debt ratio, higher quality of firm, 
because good quality companies can bear high repayment pressure of debt 
financing. They always make use of firm¶s debt financing ratio to analysis their 
investment target they choose. Consequently, a lot of listed companies employ 
a high debt ratio to communicate with the market that they have a bright future 
of operating and financial situation. Leland and Pyle (1977) built a signal model 
of expectation of investment project¶s quality. Their research result proved that 
in order to generate adequate fund for project, the demand side and the supply 
side of the fund must communicate with each other through transmission of 
signal that enable both sides obtain enough acknowledges about the cost of 
financing and the risk of investment. Especially, investors can make 
investment decision depends on the rate of return and the risk of project itself. 
When investment project LVGHFLGHGILUP¶s optimal debt financing level, as a 
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signal, reflects the risk level of the investment. 
Both theoretical and empirical researches have implication that profitability, 
size, growth opportunities, volatility, tax and non-debt tax shields have impact 
on capital structure. Harris and Raviv (1990) summarized a lot of empirical 
studies of U.S. companies, pointed that firm size, fixed asset, investment 
opportunities and non-debt tax shields boost leverage while profitability, 
volatility, advertising expenses and the probability of bankruptcy pull down 
debt ratio. However, Wald (1999) claimed leverage ratio declined with 
non-debt tax shields. This part will review some arguments about the 
determinants of capital structure.  
 
3.2 Empirical findings of determinants 
Marsh (1982) used Probit model to study the choices of companies' financing 
instruments, after setting a sample of 748 UK companies between 1959-1974 
which issued debt or company shares only with cash, he pointed out that the 
choices of companies' financing methods was decided by their current debt to 
leverage ratio to their target leverage ratio. However, target leverage ratio itself 
cannot be observed, so the effects that target leverage ratio brought must be 
considered.Target ratio is defined by the vector matrix of explanatory variables 
in Marsh¶s model, so it was important to determine the vector matrix. In his 
tests, there are four variables in this matrix: (1) compared with the average 
leverage ratio for the past ten years with the current leverage ratio, he intent to 
evaluate the degree of deviation for the target leverage ratio; (2) used 
alternatives for the target leverage ratio, he used company size, the risk of 
bankruptcy and composition of assets; (3) measurement of the change of 
financial market condition and timing including estimation of the stock market 
and bond market and the abnormal return from the two markets; (4) dividend 
payout ratio. After his study, he claimed that the risk of bankruptcy rate had a 
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negative relation (significant) to the leverage ratio while company size, 
tangibility were positively related (significant) to the leverage ratio. 
 
Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) from another perspective, developed a 
single-phase model that discovered the trade-off theory of the optimal capital 
structure. They set explanatory variables as volatility, non-debt tax shields and 
the sum of advertising and R&D expenses, divide each of them with net sales 
revenue, and set dependent variable as the book value of long term debt to the 
sum of the book value of long term debt and the market value of equity. Using 
the data from COMPUSTAT of 821 companies from 25 industries and 655 
non-regulated enterprises from 21 industries between 1962-1981, they found 
out that volatility and the sum of advertisements and R&D expenses were 
negatively related (significant) to the leverage ratio while non-debt tax shields 
had a positive relation (significant) to the leverage ratio. Their results of the 
positive relationship of non-debt tax shields with leverage ratio was against 
DeAngelo and Masulis's (1980) finding of the non-debt tax shields could be the 
alternative for tax shield. One possible reason they explained, may be that the 
more assets could be secured leaded to the higher the leverage ratio the 
company. Their findings were more likely to support for the static trade-off 
theory. 
 
Kester (1986) used the cross sectional data of 344 Japanese companies and 
452 U.S companies from 27 different industries between 4/1/1982 and 
3/31/1983, setting explanatory variables as profitability, volatility, growth 
opportunities, size, industries and countries to test dependent variable of total 
debt to book value of equity. (In fact, his test combined with four dependent 
variables, total debt to book value of equity, total debt to market value of equity, 
net debt to book value of equity, net debt to market value of equity; net debt 
represents the total debt minus cash and securities.) In his model, he found out 
that profitability had a significant negative relation to the leverage ratio, 
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volatility was negatively related but it was insignificant while growth 
opportunities was significantly positive related to the leverage ratio. Size was 
negatively related to leverage ratio but it was not statistically significant. 
However, his sample only included data of one year and also the economic 
differences between countries could also lead to different results. 
 
Later in 1988, Titman and Wessles concluded 8 potential determinants of 
capital structure including non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, size, 
volatility and profitability, etc. Although their study was based on several capital 
structure theories, but their results could be considered to be the development 
of Kester's (1986) work. They collected data of 469 countries from 1974 to 
1982, applied a factor analysis model which including measurement model 
and structural model that can affect on the capital structure. They found that 
short term debt ratio had a negative relation to the leverage ratio which may 
reflect that small and medium enterprises faced high transaction costs when 
issuing debt, that is, transaction costs was an important factor for the choices 
of capital structure. Profitability was negatively related to the current debt to 
market value of equity ratio, which represented that the expansion of market 
value of equity due to the increase of operating profit cannot fully offset by the 
cost of debt. This results further supported the theory that transaction costs 
was crucial to capital structure, and this results coincided with Mayers's (1984) 
theory that companies were more likely to financing inside of the companies. 
However, Titman and Wessels's results didn't find evidence for the connection 
between non-debt tax shields, volatility, growth opportunities to leverage ratio. 
 
In the 1990's, many researchers began to learn the determinants of capital 
structure. After studying several literature related to the determinants of capital 
structure, in Harris and Raviv (1991) work, they claimed to find out that the 
leverage ratio increases as tangibility, non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunities and size increases, while it decreases as volatility, advertisement 
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and R&D expenses, profitability increases. Rajan and Zingales (1995) used 
cross sectional data from "Global Vantage" between year 1987-1991, taking 
tangibility, growth opportunities, size and profitability as explanatory variables 
to compare with capital structure in 7 major industrialised countries. Taking 
adjusted debt (net debt minus notes receivable) to the sum of adjusted debt 
and book value or market value of equity as dependent variables, applying 
with maximum likelihood method, they found that tangibility had a significant 
positive relation to the leverage ratio while profitability was significantly 
negative related to the leverage ratio for all 7 countries. Beside Germany, 
company size was significantly positive related with the leverage ratio 
(Germany was significantly negative related while France and Italy were not 
significantly related). Also beside Germany, profitability had negative relation 
(significant) with the leverage ratio, Germany alone, were positively related but 
it was not significant as well as France and Italy. They concluded that the 
further research on America and other 6 countries showed it was still 
shortcoming for correlation tests in this theory. Later in 1999, Wald (1999) 
checked the determinants of capital structure in France, German, Japan and 
Britain using data from world-scope and sorted by non-financial and non public 
utility companies. He used explanatory variables as volatility, tangibility, 
non-debt tax shields, profitability, growth opportunities, size, etc, and used long 
term debt to book value of equity and total debt to book value of equity as 
dependent variable and he also used the heterogeneous Toby model rather 
than standard linear regression. In his test, tangibility had a positive relation 
(significant) to the leverage ratio while non-debt tax shields, profitability had 
negative relations (significant) to the leverage ratio. However, when testing 
volatility, Germany alone was negatively related to the leverage ratio (not 
significant), and it was positively related in Japan, Britain and France (not 
significant in France). When testing growth opportunities, all 4 countries were 
positively related (not significant in France). The results turned out that 
systems and policies in each countries may be a crucial determinant of capital 
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structure, and because each countries have different agent and supervision 
problem, the results could be distinct.  
 
The above tests were carried out in developed countries however, in order to 
seek whether it was different in developing markets, Booth etc. (2001) did a 
research on the determinants of capital structure for 10 developing countries 
(including India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Mexico, 
Brazil, Jordan, and South Korea). They tried to explain the differences 
between variables in determine capital structure by using static trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory and agency cost theory. When testing trade-off theory, 
variables were tax rate, type of assets, volatility, profitability and bankruptcy 
law; when testing pecking order theory, the immaturity of financial markets had 
great influences on capital structure; when testing agency cost theory, the 
potential conflict between the inside and outside investors became important, 
where asset characteristics (tangibility) and growth opportunities became 
crucial determinants. They expanded Rajan and Zingales (1995)'s model, 
added average tax rates and volatility in the estimate formula. They used panel 
data for sample of companies within each country, used fixed effect model and 
pool OLS model for this study. The results turned out that it was similar 
between developing countries and developed countries on the determinants of 
capital structure, however, in some determinants, especially volatility and 
market to book value was contrary to expectations. Maybe it was because in 
developing countries, the influence that excessive short term liabilities and 
business credit financing to capital structure differ from long term liabilities. 
Overall, the leverage ratio in developing countries seemed to have received a 
similar significantly affect both in variables and in ways to developed countries. 
However, the influence that variables like GDP growth, inflation rate and the 
development of capital market to capital structure in those countries was 
different and still not defined. 
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A further study on Chinese companies was carried out by Lu and Xin (1998). 
They took a sample of 35 listed Chinese companies in Machinery and 
Transport equipment industry, by using multiple linear regression, they found 
that profitability was significantly negative related to capital structure; size, 
growth opportunities was not significant and profitability, size, growth 
opportunities were not significantly related to long term debt ratio. However, as 
the sample was small, there could be data deficiencies in their tests. Later in 
2000, Hong and Shen (2000) took a sample of 221 industrial companies listed 
in Shanghai Stock Exchange between 1995-1997, they found out that size and 
profitability had a significant influence to capital structure while growth 
opportunities was not significant. Xiao and Wu (2002) selected 117 non 
financial companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 1996 and 
1999 using multiple linear regression. The found out that ownership structure 
was crucial to capital structure, the value of asset-backed, size and costs of 
financial distress were positively related to the level of debt while growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shields were negatively related. Xiao later in 2004 
developed their previous work, he chose 239 listed non financial companies, 
he then found out that transaction costs were an important determinant for 
choosing capital structure, and tangibility, size had a positive relationship with 
leverage ratio, growth opportunities was negative related while non-debt tax 
shield was insignificantly related to capital structure. 
 
From management point of view, Moh'D, Perry and Rimbey (1998) used data 
of 311 manufacturing companies from 1972 to 1989 and used TSCS model to 
study the influence from ownership structure to the company's debt policy. 
They set book value of long term debt divided by the sum of book value of long 
term debt and market value of equity as y, took variables like percentage of 
insider stock holding, percentage of institutional investor holding, cash 
dividend payout, growth opportunities, size, volatility, tax rate and non-debt tax 
shield, etc. They discovered that the percentage of insider holding and the 
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percentage of institutional investor holding had a significant negative 
relationship with leverage ratio, which more or less, supported the theory that 
institutional investor could be alternative to liabilities disciplinary. Overall, their 
work showed strong support for agency costs theory that the higher 
percentage of insider holdings would force managers to control the company's 
financial policies and seek their own benefits 
 
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), the 
optimal capital structure and ownership is to minimize total agency cost. So it 
is believed that there may some relationship between capital structure and 
ownership structure. For example, Leland and Pyle (1997) and Berger et al. 
(1997) suggested, theoretically, debt ratio is positively related with 
management stock ownership, while Friend and Lang (1988) believed this 
relationship is negative. Higher ownership concentration, less agency cost 
between managers and shareholders as they have same interest. In order to 
avoid of dilute of stock rights, shareholders prefer using debt financing. There 
seems no explicit expectation about the relationship between leverage and 
ownership structure due to conflict empirical findings.  
 
There is a increasing of studies focus on the political connections with capital 
structure. Evidences suggest that political connections have, direct and 
indirect, positive impact on firms¶ value and companies¶ performance in 
diversified ways (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). However, Shleiger and 
Vishny (1994) found firms with direct state ownership cannot avoid being 
associated with the pursuit of political motives by sacrificing other 
shareholders¶ interests in the firm. Agreeing their point of view, Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) suggested that state owned enterprises then to have more 
debt financing but poorer performance than comparable private companies. 
Nevertheless, Khwaja and Mian (2005) showed that state ownership enable 
firm to access debt easily but it has passive effects on firm performance and 
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managerial incentives. Lending decisions are made by state owned banks for 
political motivation as well (Sapienza, 2004). Western researches mainly focus 
on the administrative ownership and capital structure, but in China managers 
hold few or even zero shares of shares for the listed companies they work in. 
However, In China, state ownership and legal person ownership are the main 
parts of non-tradable shares which reflect ownership concentration. Xiao (2003) 
suggest that high ownership concentration leading to high leverage because 
owners holding large proportion of non-tradable shares are state, government, 
state own institutions and so on, which have convenience to access loans from 
state owned banks. 
 
3.3 Dynamism, capital structure and performance 
Through strict mathematical deduction, Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved 
that capital structure policy is irrelevant with firm¶s value and performance in a 
perfect market. The MM proposition based on several assumptions so that 
complicated factors of real market are removed abstractly, but in a real world 
there exist information asymmetries, bankruptcy cost, transaction costs, and 
different lending and borrowing costs. Bradley et al. (1984) assumed volatility 
of firm¶s value, potential effects of financial distress and non-debt tax shields 
have impacts on the optimal capital structure of firm. They found that the 
uncertainty of firm¶s income and possibility of financial distress have expected 
negative influence on firm¶s capital structure. Thies and Klock (1992) 
lucubrated in manufactory industry and analyzed the elements of capital 
structure, such as types of convertible bonds, preference share and common 
shares and so on. They tested that these elements varied when the growth 
rate of sales (which is the proxy of environmental variation) changed. They 
found when the volatility of sales income increased which meant instability of 
environment, long-term debt financing would decrease. Their research result 
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suggests the variable of environment affects capital structure policy. 
Furthermore, they also concluded that tax incentive encourages debt financing, 
bankruptcy and agency costs restrict borrowing, and information asymmetries 
has constrained power on raising debt. Chung (1993) studied capital structure 
from operating risk and characteristics of assets and found the uncertainty of 
market (volatility of demand) has negative relationship with capital structure. 
For instance, when facing low uncertainty of market, firms working on public 
service tend to use much debt financing. In a strongly dynamic environment, 
there is a negative relationship between capital structure and firm¶s 
performance, while in a stable environment this relationship becomes positive   
(Simerly and Li, 2000).   
 
Compared to the developed market in the U.S., China¶s market has a relatively 
short time and still been in immature stage and the studies are behind 
developed markets, especially little empirical researches. But more and more 
researchers has recognized the importance of empirical study and obtained 
some achievements. Huang and Zhang (2001) worked on empirical study 
about the determinants of capital structure by using listed companies data in 
1993, 1995 and 1997 respectively. Their findings suggest that when there is 
lack of government intervention or firm¶s operating situation changes acutely, 
the theories of capital structure has stronger explanatory power of firms ¶ debt 
to asset ratio. According to the empirical study of capital structure of listed 
companies (Huang and Zhang, 2001), listed companies has an intense equity 
financing preference. This result reflects that China¶s current regime and 
guidance of policy has biased effects on the theories of financing. Chen and 
Xu (2001) explore the relationship among capital structure, firm¶s performance 
and experience of protecting investors¶ interests and consequently point that 
long-term debt ratio is negatively related with firm¶s performance because of 
being short of protection to outside investors. Yu (2001) researches the 
relationship of equity structure, management efficiency and firm ¶s performance, 
33 
 
and found there is a significant negative relationship between debt to asset 
ratio and firm¶s performance.  
 
 
Chapter 4. Research methodology 
In this chapter, research methodology can be divided to 4 steps: choosing 
sample set, constructing variables, summarizing statistics and examining 
models.  
 
4.1 Hypothesis 
From the literature part, 3 hypotheses have been carried out: 
(1) firm¶s specific factors of capital structure found in Chinese listed companies 
are consistent with the findings in developed countries; 
(2) ownership concentration is positively related to leverage ratio for Chinese 
listed companies; 
(3) under dynamic environment, leverage is negatively related to firm¶s 
performance ; under stable environment, leverage is positively related to 
firm¶s performance.  
 
4.2 Sample set 
Data used for this research is from annual reports of 212 Chinese listed 
companies, 70 in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 152 Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for the period 2007-2011. The accounting time is considered to be 
from 2007 because Chinese listed companies prepare financial statements 
follow new corporate accounting standards issued in 2007 by the state council 
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as well as bankruptcy law and tax law. These annual reports are downloaded 
from CSMAR database. The whole dataset consist of 300 listed companies in 
both SZSE and SHSE called Hushen 300 index. This index reflects trend of 
Chinese A-shares stock market. In china, there are A-shares traded by 
Chinese currency Yuan, B-shares using foreign currency and H-shares for 
companies listed in Hong Kong. Samples in Hushen 300 cover more than 60% 
market value and 83% market net profit of SZSE and SHSE and sample 
companies do not include ST stock, anomalous waving stock, foul play stock 
and firms which have been liquidated or stopped operation.  
 
Companies which belong to financial sector (banking, insurance firms et al.) 
are not included. One of the reasons is that companies in financial sector has 
more specific features of capital structure than firms in other companies as 
well as tax treatment, and the other one is that the very high leverage level of 
financial companies may lead to biased analysis result (Lasfer, 1995; Rajan 
and Zingals, 1995). In order to have data of five years, firms listed after 2007 
are excluded. As a result, the finally sample set contains a balanced panel 
data of 212 companies from 2007 to 2010.  
 
4.3 Variables construction 
Two measurements of dependent variables for models of capital structure 
determinants are employed, overall leverage which is the total debt scaled by 
total asset and long-term leverage which is the long-term debt to total asset. 
The total asset is measured of total debt plus book value of equity because 
equity contains non-tradable shares and outstanding shares and there are 
significant capital gains or loss of outstanding shares. The explanatory 
variables are concluded from theoretical and empirical studies: profitability, 
firm size, tangibility of asset, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, non-debt 
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tax shields, tax and equity concentration.  
 
For model used to test the effect of environmental dynamism and capital 
structure on firm¶s performance, ROA is measured for the performance of firms; 
overall leverage is employed for the measure of capital structure; the indicator 
used to test environmental dynamism is volatility of sales. Table 2 summarizes 
the measurement and literature of variables. 
Table 2 measurement of variables 
Variables Measurement literature 
profitability (ROA) 
earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) to total asset 
Titman and Wessels(1988);Rajan 
and Zingales(1995) 
size logarithm of total asset 
Titman and Wessels(1988);Rajan 
and Zingales(1995) 
tangibility (tang) fixed asset to total asset 
Rajan and Zingales(1995);Bevan 
and Danbolt(2004) 
growth - 
opportunities  
(growthr) 
Tobins' Q7 
Rajan and Zingales(1995);Booth 
et al.(2001) 
volatility (vol) 
standard deviation of EBIT 
scaled by total asset 
Titman and Wessels(1988);Wald 
(1999) 
volatility of sales 
(volsa) 
standard deviation of sales 
scaled by total asset 
thies and Klock(1992) 
Non-debt tax 
- shields (NDTS) 
Depreciation and amortization 
divided by total asset 
Wald(1999);Chaplinsky and 
Niehaus(1993) 
tax effective income tax to EBT MacKie-Mason(1990) 
equity - 
concentration 
(ntrds) 
non-tradable shares to total 
shares 
Xiao(2003) 
                                                          
7
 Tobin͛Q is defined as market to book ratio of total asset. 
36 
 
4.4 Summary statistics 
As the data in this sample set is cross-sectional and time-serial, panel data is 
employed for models. Table 3 shows the average long-term leverage is 21.29% 
and the mean of total debt ratio is 52.42%, this supports the findings in table 1 
that Chinese companies prefer current debt to long-term debt, some 
companies even do not have long-term at all as the minimum of long-term debt 
is zero. The max long-term and total debt are negative is due to one of the 
listed firms has a negative equity because of negative retained earnings in 
2007.  
 
The negative minimum return on equity suggests some firms have losses of 
profit as well. Non-debt tax shield is measure by using depreciation and 
amortization so that the reason of negative minimum non-debt tax shield may 
be appreciation in fixed asset, or intangible asset, or in both. Negative 
minimum of tax and the maximum of tax are due to deferred tax because tax 
rate calculated by using the effective tax divided earnings before tax. The 
average tax rate is 18.6% which is less than 25% of the new tax law is the 
result of supporting policy for tax benefits for large firms by government (most 
companies in Hushen 300 are large companies). Zero of non-tradable shares 
to total asset means all the equity of the firm is outstanding shares, no state 
ownership and LP ownership, while 0.92 of the ratio shows high equity 
concentration, such companies are SEOs.  
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Table 3 summary statistics 
Ld is for long-term debt ratio while td is for total debt. ³Between´ is as the individual for unit i, 
and ³within  ´is as the time for period t. ³N´ is for numbers of observations and ³n´ is the number 
of firms.  
 
Correlation matrix is employed to test the multicollinearity. Collinearity may 
happen if there is high correlation between two variables. Though there is no 
agreement when the correlation is too high (0.8 or 0.9 (Kennedy, 1998), 0.7 
Anderson et al. (1999)), the matrix in table 4 shows explanatory variables in 
this sample set do not have strong multicollinearity, except earnings volatility 
and sales volatility. There is no consideration because these two variables 
used for different models separately, but to some extent it means both of the 
two variables can be used as a measure of environmental dynamism.  
 
         within                .2045732  -.2856208    .840602       T =       5
         between               .1535449   .0098961   .7108169       n =     212
ntrds    overall    .2969328   .2556114          0        .92       N =    1060
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         within                .0713554   .2238419   .9461349   T-bar = 4.99528
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         within                .0889485  -.2070496   .8372744   T-bar = 4.98585
         between               .1623247          0   .9547282       n =     212
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       ntrds    -0.0229  -0.0072   0.0373  -0.0595   0.0762  -0.1783   0.1460   0.1533   0.0020  -0.0381   1.0000
         tax    -0.0020   0.0341   0.0028  -0.0074   0.0163   0.0084   0.0466   0.0458  -0.0352   1.0000
        NDTS    -0.0881   0.0439   0.0580  -0.0765  -0.0125  -0.0478   0.0822   0.0858   1.0000
       volsa    -0.2215  -0.1525   0.3210  -0.2170  -0.0194   0.2898   0.9894   1.0000
         vol    -0.2065  -0.1288   0.2996  -0.2371  -0.0157   0.2706   1.0000
     growthr    -0.3594  -0.4355   0.4099  -0.1289  -0.1278   1.0000
        tang     0.1950  -0.1161   0.0248   0.0890   1.0000
        size     0.1908   0.0540   0.2685   1.0000
         roa    -0.2727  -0.4139   1.0000
          td     0.6174   1.0000
          ld     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                     ld       td      roa     size     tang  growthr      vol    volsa     NDTS      tax    ntrds
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common and fixed. Thus, the basic pooled model is: 
                yit  Į[¶itȕXit                       (M1) 
             where uit ~ iid N(0, ı2u) 
where y is the dependent variable, Į is the constant, x¶ is 1*k vector of k 
explanatory variables, i is ith individual, t is tth time period, u is the disturbance 
term which is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of ı2. 
 
The pooled model essentially postulates that both the intercept and the slope 
are constant across units and time, but the assumptions might be restrictive. 
Pooled model could be proper if there is no individual or time specific impact.  
 
According to Gujarati (2003), if there exist unobserved effects of unfound firm 
and time specific determinants on dependent variable, it can be solved by 
employ one of the random effect model and the fixed effect model, i.e.  
Įi Į 
 
If Įi is correlated with regressors, the OLS estimates are not consistent due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed effect (FE) model can be employed: 
yit  Įi + x¶itȕXit                       (M2) 
             where uit ~ iid N(0, ı2u) 
 
FE model suggest the existence of individual¶s intercept, but the intercept does 
not vary over time, the with-groups estimator can eliminate Įi so that OLS still 
can be used. Reporting an overall intercept in FE estimation arises from 
viewing the Įi as parameters to estimate. The overall intercept is the average 
of the individual specific intercepts. 
40 
 
 
If Įi is not correlated with regressors, the OLS estimates are consistent but not 
efficient. The random effect model can be used: 
yit  Į[¶itȕXit                       (M3) 
               where uit ȝi Ȟit  
ȝi ~ iid Nı2u) 
 
Unlike fixed effect estimation, the error term in random effect model includes 
both individual specific effect and a combination error of time series and 
cross-section so that unobserved effects can be captured.  
 
The regression model designed for determinants of capital structure are: 
Tdit Į0+ȕ1ROAit+ȕ2Sizeit+ȕ3tangit+ȕ4volit+ȕ5NDTSit+ȕ6taxit+ȕ7ntrdsit
+ uit                                 i=1,«..,212;  t=1,«,6. 
Ldit Į0+ȕ1ROAit+ȕ2Sizeit+ȕ3tangit+ȕ4volit+ȕ5NDTSit+ȕ6taxit+ȕ7ntrdsit
+ uit                                i=1,«..,212;  t=1,«,6. 
Where Td is the leverage ratio of total debt, Ld is long-term debt ratio, ROA is 
profitability, tang is tangibility of asset, vol is proxy for business risk, NDTS is 
non-debt tax shields, tax is effective tax rate, ntrds is equity concentration and 
u is for the residual.  
 
The regression model for dynamism, capital structure and performance is: 
ROAit Į0+ȕ1Volsait+ȕ2Sizeit+ȕ3leverageit+ȕ4Dy*leit +uit 
    i=1,«..,212;  t=1,«,6. 
 
³Dy´ and volsa are for the environmental dynamism, i.e. volatility of sales. In 
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the model, size of firms is added in the regression. Since environmental 
dynamism has influence on leverage ratio, the interaction between leverage 
and dynamism has been employed in the model, i.e. ³Dy*leit´.  
 
All the definition of variables used in these three regression is same as listed in 
table 2. 
 
To choose which estimator to be used, Breusch-pagan LM test is employed to 
test random effect against pooled OLS and Hausman test is used to 
discriminate random effect and fixed effect. Each of the result of the above 
three models of Breusch-pagan LM test shows rejection of the null that there is 
no firm specific effects. Hausman test results for the three models should reject 
the null of no correlation between individual effects Įi. Therefore, fixed effect 
estimator has been employed for the regression. 
 
 
Chapter 5. Regression results and analysis 
Most of the regression results of capital structure determinants are consistent 
with theories and empirical studies in developed countries, but some 
determinants do not show significant power to the relationship with leverage. 
This is due to specific features of Chinese market and government policies. 
For the political connection effect, non-tradable equity to total equity is 
employed as the explanatory viable. The regression results show significant 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and leverage for 
Chinese listed firms. However, the regression to test the joint effect of 
environmental dynamism and capital structure on firms performance do not 
show statistic significance. 
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5.1 result and analysis of determinants of capital 
structure 
 
Table 5 regression results for determinants of capital structure 
Dependent variable:  Td Ld 
explanatory variables  
  
    
ROA -0.181** -0.139* 
 
(-3.26) (-2.04) 
Size -0.00787 -0.00612 
 
(-1.66) (-1.05) 
tang 0.00606*   0.0967   
 
(0.15)     (1.93) 
growthr -0.00527** -0.00751* 
 
(-1.85) (-2.13) 
vol -0.0418 -0.406*** 
 
   (-0.74) (-5.85) 
NDTS    -0.160 -0.531 
 
   (-0.41)     (-1.09)    
tax 0.0120 0.00519 
 
(1.62) (0.57) 
ntrds 0.0470*** 0.0447** 
 
(3.96) (3.05) 
_cons 0.732*** 0.433*** 
 
(7.34) (3.52) 
R2 0.2673 0.2318 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
N 1029      1027 
LM test 849.96     702.96 
 
′0.000″     (0.000) 
Hausman test  702.96     133.78 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 Significant level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
Profitability 
7KHSUHGLFWLRQVRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\DQGOHYHUDJHDUH
contradicted though lots of theoretical researches have been made since 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Pecking order theory suggest that profitable firms 
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borrow less because firms prefer to use retained earnings as the first choice of 
fund for investment, while tax-based model consider that firms will increase 
leverage level due to tax shield for paying out interest. Agency theory proves a 
conflict prediction. Williamson (1988) stated that debt has discipline power 
enforce managers to distribute profits rather than overinvestment. Profitable 
firms may have large free cash flow, high leverage can restrict managers 
discretion. In contrast, profitable companies will borrow less as the optimal 
contract between the firms¶ internal and external investors can be explained as 
an integration of debt and equity.   
 
Most of the empirical studies showed a negative relationship between leverage 
and profitability. Consistent result were found in the U.S. market (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Friend and Lang,1988). Kester ¶s (1986) study showed that 
profitability is negatively related leverage in both Japan and U.S.. The studies 
using international data support the negative relationship as well, for example, 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) for developed countries, Booth er al. (2001) and 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) for developing countries.   
 
The regression result in table 5 shows strong negative relationship between 
capital structure (both total debt and long-term debt ratio) and profitability, 
which suggests the view of pecking order theory. Firms have high profitability 
can generate enough funds from retained earnings to meet its demand rather 
than raising debt. In the contrast, if firms¶ profitability is low, they will choose 
suboptimal financing ± debt, then leading to high leverage. For Chinese listed 
companies, if their financial reports show high profitability and low leverage, 
such companies are welcomed to be invested because investors think these 
companies have low operation risk. As a result, firms with high profitability tend 
to use retained earnings for refinancing or use comparatively cheaper 
(because of high demand) and easily accessed equity financing. Thus, high 
profitability leads to low leverage level. 
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Firm Size 
There are lots of studies suggest debt ratio is positively correlated with firm 
size which is consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory (Marsh 1982; 
Poitevin, 1989; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002). One of the reasons for the positive relationship is that the ratio 
of bankruptcy costs to firm¶s value will decrease by the increase of firm¶s value. 
As large firms are always well diversified in operation and management, and 
have low probability of bankruptcy and stable cash flow, then the bankruptcy 
cost has smaller impact on the financing decision (Harris and Raviv, 1990; 
Stulz, 1990). From the perspective of costs of financing decision, firm choosing 
debt or equity financing depends on its size. Marsh (1982) states in his study 
that, large firms prefer using long-term debt while small firms often choose 
short-term debt. This is because large firms can take advantages of economic 
scales and have bargaining power to banks. Compared to large firms, small 
firms face higher risk of bankruptcy so that have higher cost of equity. Thus, 
small firms prefer short-term debts.  
 
However, the empirical study in table 5 show a negative relationship between 
firm size and capital structure, but it is not statistically significant.  According 
to pecking order theory, size somehow conveys information to outside 
investors. Large firms tend to disclosure more information than small firms do 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Due to less information 
asymmetry problems, firms tend to issue more equity than raising debt for 
financing decision, which leads to low leverage. Large firms have low 
probability of bankruptcy and stable cash flow not only leading to low costs of 
debt financing but also in result of low equity cost. Large firms in China always 
have better reputation than small firms and are attractive for the secondary 
market investors so that they can generate fund by ³cheap equity´. Empirical 
study also suggests negative relationship between size and capital structure 
had been found in Germany (Wald, 1999). Thus, there is no clear boundary of 
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the relationship is positive or negative. In Chinese market, firms involved in 
direct or indirect state ownership have convenience to access to bank loans 
but large companies can raise cheap funds by equity due to good reputation. 
Thus, firm size does not show significant relationship with capital structure for 
Chinese liested companies.  
 
Tangibility 
Structure of asset can be thought from two aspects: liquidity asset and 
illiquidity asset; tangible asset and intangible asset. Firms with more liquidity 
asset tend to use more current debt. On the one hand when firms have more 
current asset which represent high liquidity, they have stronger capacity to 
repay debt in time, as a result creditor prefer lending moneys for such firms. 
On the other hand, firms who have more current asset probably use such 
asset to raise funds for investment projects. The liquidity of asset reflects 
shareholders enhance their control of asset at expense of bondholders ¶ 
interest. 
 
Theories generally show positively relationship of capital structure and 
tangibility (Friend and Lang, 1988; Wald, 1999). The collateral value of asset is 
a key factor of capital structure decision and different classified asset have 
different collateral value. Intangible assets could have value only when firm is 
in operation, as long as firm suffers bankruptcy, the intangible assets 
disappear. Thus, in order to reduce the risk of information asymmetries, 
creditors generally ask firms to provide tangible asset as collaterals to protect 
their own interests. Tangible assets as collateral with less asset specificity can 
reduce lender¶s risk (Williamson, 1988). Thus, firm have large proportion of 
tangible asset can access to debt easily so that its tangibility and capital 
structure have positive relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest the 
positive relationship based on agency costs theory. Large proportion of 
tangible asset reduces the costs of long-term debt for firms. If the proportion of 
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intangible asset is large, managers can use asset specificity to distributed 
asset for their own interest and creditors face difficulties of supervision. 
Furthermore, new issued shares may be underpriced due to information 
asymmetries, using debt with asset collateral can reduce such costs.  
 
The tangibility is positively correlated to capital structure in table 5 which is 
consistent with theories, but the relationship between long-term leverage and 
tangibility is not statistically significant. This may because Chinese listed 
companies tend to use more current debt instead of long-term debt as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and tangibility is not the only factors that banks will 
concern for making the decision of lending loans. Also, lots of firms in China 
take loans from bank by using joint guarantee for each other or fiduciary loans 
instead of using fixed asset as collateral. Thus, long-term leverage does not 
show significant relationship with tangibility of asset. 
 
Growth opportunities 
According to signaling theory, firms which have more growth opportunities tend 
to use more debt financing (Ross, 1977). Firms try to tell outside investors they 
have more growth chances and high expected incomes in order to raising 
more money and decrease the probability of bankruptcy. Consisting with 
signaling theory, pecking order theory also suggests firms with high growth 
rate have more difficulties of internal financing so that they have to use 
suboptimal choice of debt financing. Thus, growth opportunity is negatively 
related to leverage. 
 
The findings in table 5 show negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. First of all, according to agency theory, Myers 
(1977) and Jensen (1986) suggest firms have tendency to deprive debt 
holders¶ wealth by suboptimal investment. Agency costs could be very 
expensive in firms with high growth rate since these firms have more flexible 
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investment opportunities. Thus, the growth opportunity which reflects conflict 
between shareholders and debt holders is negatively related to leverage. 
Secondly, growth opportunities are a kind of intangible asset which cannot be 
used as collateral and produce profit. This shows firms with more growth 
opportunities tend to raise less debt than firms with more tangible assets. 
Thirdly, firms with high growth rate generally belong to emerging industry in 
which firms have comparatively large operating risk and high probabil ity of 
bankruptcy. Such firms face difficulties to raise debt and higher costs of capital. 
Thus, firms with high growth opportunities have lower leverage (Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Barclay and Smith, 1995). Chinese market is emerging market 
and lots of firms have high growth rate, so that the leverage level is relatively 
lower than developed countries.   
 
Earnings volatility 
Trade-off theory suggests earnings volatility is negatively related to leverage 
level. Bhaduri (2002) mentions companies which have high volatility of 
earnings are doubted by lenders whether they can meet repayment 
requirements, thereby leading to high costs if financial distress occurs. As a 
result, such companies have to reduce borrowing in order to reduce 
bankruptcy risk or high costs of refinancing. Pecking order theory predicts 
positive relationship as well. Firms which have high earnings volatility face 
rigorous problem of adverse selection (DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980). In order 
to solve adverse selection problem, these firms should repay debt or invest in 
high liquidity securities when generate surpluses to ensure their capacity of 
debt for financing requirements and avoiding high costs of issuing new shares 
in the future. Myers (1977) also suggest that firms which have high volatile 
earnings tend to generate more cash in good years to prevent itself from 
underinvestment problems in the future. Thus, high volatility of earnings leads 
to less debt financing for firms. 
The findings in table 5 show negative relationship between earnings volatility 
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and debt level. This result is consistent with theories talked above. Those 
Chinese listed companies with high volatility of earnings have a low leverage 
level. This supports the point of view that firms of high volatile earnings burden 
more risk of bankruptcy or financial distress, facing difficulties for raising debt. 
But the relationship in the findings do not show statistic significant in the 
measure of total debt. This is perhaps for the reason that Chinese f irms prefer 
short-term borrowings for which lenders may not consider longer accounting 
period. And the interest for loans is controlled by bank which owned by state, it 
cannot completely reflect the risk level. Firms with high risk may tend to use 
more short-term as the costs of debt is cheaper than it should be. For the 
measure of long-term debt, the earnings volatility is negatively related to 
long-term leverage at a strong significant level of 1%. This can be explained by 
the reason that banks in China examine the firms¶ financial position and 
operating performance every year for long-term loans (generally longer than 1 
year). If banks find firms have unstable earnings indicating high business, they 
will ask firms to repay debt immediately. Thus, the volatility of earnings and 
long-term leverage has strong negative relationship. 
 
Non-debt tax shield 
According to trade-off theory, the advantage of borrowing is interest payment is 
tax deductible. Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest managers can increase 
firm¶s value by using debt as interest payment reduces income tax. However, 
firms which have other tax shields items, such as depreciation of fixed asset 
and amortization of intangible asset, will be less motivated by the advantage of 
tax shield. These tax shields are non-debt tax shields which are not affected by 
the decision of choosing which methods for financing (Ozkan, 2001). Those 
non-debt tax shield items are used as substitutes for tax advantage of debt. As 
a result, firms tend to use less debt to keep a low debt ratio and reduce 
operating risks.  
Empirical studies (Bradley et al., 1984; Banerjee et al., 2000) support the 
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negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. But, the 
finding of the negative relationship in table 5 is not statistically significant, 
which is consistent with the result of Xiao¶s (2003) study. This is perhaps 
because the measurement for non-debt tax shields is calculated by using 
depreciation and amortization scaled by total asset. Xiao (2003) suggest that 
depreciation can be proxy for other variables as well which lead to offset 
effects to leverage ratio. Thus, the negative relationship between non-debt tax 
shields and debt ratio is not statistically significant. 
 
Tax 
Adjusted MM proposition suggest with the existence of tax deduction of debt, 
firms create value of increasing leverage level. Research by Chowdhury and 
Miles (1989) supports tax rate is positively related with leverage ratio. 
According to trade-off theory, debt financing not only provide tax shield, but 
also bring risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. If firm one-sided focus on 
the tax advantage of debt but ignores the risks, the increasing probability of 
financial distress and bankruptcy augments extra costs of capital and reduce 
firm¶s value. Hallet and Taffler (1982) find negative relationship between tax 
rate and leverage. 
 
The result in table 5 does not show significant positive relationship of effective 
income tax rate and leverage level for Chinese listed companies. This result is 
in line with studies by Xia (2004), and Jin (2006). Wang (2011) who works in 
National Tax Bureau stated, China has a huge market and the development 
level is unbalanced among different regions. He also mentioned firms in less 
developed area take heavy pressure by uniform tax policy and tax preference 
policy concentrate on the east part of China where economy is more 
prosperous. Firms in less developed area face more risk than those in 
developed region due to heavy burden of tax and suffer higher costs of capital. 
These firms may not use much debt for the advantage of tax deduction. 
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Non-tradable equity 
High ownership concentration is a main feature of equity structure in Chinese 
listed firms. This is because lots of listed companies in China are SOEs before. 
Such companies have few owners which hold large number of shares of the 
firms. These owners can make the operating decision of firms directly. With the 
number of ³large´ shareholders increasing, the economic scale increases and 
equity financing will decrease the control power of existing ³large´ 
shareholders (Xiao, 2003). In order to protect their own interest, ³large´ 
shareholders prefer to use debt financing. Furthermore, Xiao (2003) also 
suggest that debt is one of the ways to control non-pecuniary compensation of 
managers in order to reduce agency costs. Debt acts as a discipline to 
supervise manager ¶s activity. Thus, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and leverage should be positive. Firth (1995) and Berger et al. 
(1997) studied on a sample of the U.S. firms and reached the same conclusion.  
The results in table 5 strongly support the positive relationship. This result is 
also consistent with the view talked in chapter 2 that firms in China have direct 
or indirect state ownership have more debt equity because of convenience of 
accessing debt from bank 
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5.2 Results and analysis of environmental dynamism 
and capital structure 
Table 6 regression result for the relationship of environmental dynamism, capital 
structure and firm performance 
Dependent variable:  ROA 
explanatory variables  
  
volsa -0.306** 
 
(-2.92) 
Dy*le 0.0587 
 
(0.29)    
leverage -0.0878** 
 
(-3.27) 
size 0.0455*** 
 
(18.13) 
_cons -0.817*** 
 
(-14.67) 
R2 0.3137 
P-value 0.000 
N 1032 
LM test 373.34 
 
(0.000) 
Hausman test 115.45 
  (0.000) 
 Significant level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
Table 6 shows the regression result test for the relationship between firms¶ 
performance and interaction of environmental dynamism and capital. 
Environmental dynamism (volatility of sales) is negatively related with firm ¶s 
performance with statistic significance as well as leverage. This implies in the 
transition economy of China, the increasing of environmental dynamism and 
debt lead to decreasing of firm¶s performance. Positive relationship between 
firm size and performance is found and it is statistically significant at 1% level. 
This supports that big listed companies perform much well than small ones in 
China. This is consistent with the point that a lot of big firms have state 
ownership so that they can easily get both political and financial supports from 
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government. The relationship between firm¶s performance and the interaction 
of environmental dynamism and leverage is not significant. The third 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
According to agency theory, firms tend to use debt in a stable environment 
because debt financing can reduce free cash flow controlled by agent to avoid 
speculate activity of managers (Thies and Klock, 1992; Simerly and Li, 2000). 
If debt holders undertake more risk, they will ask agent for higher interest. 
Conflict between agent and principals will be smooth with the increasing of 
debt since agent receives the supervision from debt holders. Thus, debt 
financing has advantages for improving firm¶s performance. This is why 
Simerly and Li¶s (2000) study of the U.S. firms suggests that debt is positively 
related to firm¶s performance under stable environment and negatively related 
to firm¶s performance in high dynamic environment. 
 
However, China has a very different market. In China, most debt of firms is 
bank loans and there are few corporate bonds (Zhang, 2009). Interest rate for 
bank loans is controlled by government and not completely affected by firms ¶ 
financial leverage in China, it cannot fully reflect risk level, but the length of 
loan period. As a result, adverse selection in Chinese debt market is popular 
that higher risk project tend to raising more debt. This implies most Chinese 
listed firms do not choose which method for raising capital depending on 
environment dynamism. Furthermore, debt financing do not have much 
supervision power of agent because state is one of the owner of lots of listed 
companies and most banks are state owned. Both debtors and creditors are 
directly or indirectly related with state as a result soft constrained relationship 
among banks, firms and agent cannot supervise and prevent agent doing 
corrupt activities or adverse selection and so on which could reduce firm¶s 
performance. Moreover, Chinese listed firms¶ capital structure does not reflect 
trade-off theory which suggests optimal capital structure is the trade-off 
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between equity and debt. But Chinese listed firms tend to use equity financing 
rather than debt financing because costs of equity financing usually is cheaper 
than costs of raising debt. Many studies (Shi, 2000; Huang and Zhang 2001; 
Xiao, 2003) suggest that Chinese firms have strong preference of using equity 
financing to debt. Thus, Chinese listed firms make capital structure decision do 
not depend on environment dynamism.  Therefore, the relationship between 
firm¶s performance and interaction of environment dynamism and leverage is 
not significant.  
 
 
Chapter6. Limitations and Conclusion 
6.1 Limitations 
The first limitation is that the accounting period is from 2007 to 2011, during 
which, the world stock markets including Chinese stock market suffered crisis 
in 2008. This may affect firm¶s capital structure and lead to bias when analysis. 
 
The second limitation is sample set (companies in Hushen 300) chosen for this 
paper. Though Hushen 300 is a good representative of Chinese A-shares 
market, but it does not include all firms in A-shares market. As a result, the 
findings of this study may be efficient but insufficient. 
 
The third limitation is that the proxies for variable may be not perfect to 
represent the theoretical proposition though they are constructed theoretically 
and empirically. However, it is a common problem in the study area of capital 
structure. 
 
The fourth limitation is that this paper is mainly focus on firms ¶ specific factors 
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and there must be other factors affect firm¶s capital structure and performance. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
Firm¶s specific factors that influence capital structure in Chinese listed 
companies are similar to but not exactly the same as the determinants of 
capital structure found in developed countries. Profitability and growth 
opportunities are significantly positively related to firm¶s total leverage and 
long-term leverage ratio. Firm¶ size does not have significant influence on 
capital structure. Tangibility is positively related with, total debt significantly 
while long-term debt insignificantly. Volatility of earnings has insignificant 
relationship with total leverage but strong negative relationship with long-term 
debt. Both non-tax shields and tax rate are not significantly related with total 
leverage and long-term leverage. There is significantly positive relationship 
between non-tradable shares proportion and total leverage, and long-term 
leverage respectively. Leverage is negatively related with firm performance. 
The interaction of environment dynamism and capital structure does not have 
significant impact on firm¶s performance.  
 
The findings of Chinese listed companies are consistent with research result of 
developed countries in some extent. But there are still some differences that 
firm size, non-debt tax shields and tax rate do not have significant impact on 
capital structure and ownership concentration have significantly positive 
relationship with capital structure for Chinese listed companies. This is 
because Chinese market is still in a transition economy. Market is not 
disciplined completely by itself and intervened by government to a great extent. 
Bankruptcy law and tax law are different with developed countries, these affect 
firms decision for operating and capital structure. Chinese listed firms have 
strong preference of equity financing because costs of equity financing is 
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cheap than it should be, especially large companies and state owned 
enterprises. Problem of information asymmetries in China is severe and 
related law for information disclosure does not have strong protective power 
for outside investors. Outside investors may be misled by firms. Thus, capital 
structure of Chinese listed firms may not provide perfectly true information for 
outside investors. As an important part of the world economy, China should 
speed up its step from transition economy to market economy. Chinese 
government should accelerate its step to construct sound supervision and 
management mechanism and improve information disclosure system to 
reduce information asymmetry problems. Firms should increase the proportion 
of shares hold by manager so that firm¶s interest and manager¶s interest are 
related, and also reform encourages mechanism of managers to change the 
preference of equity financing. 
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